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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MIDWEST REALTY, a Utah ) 
Corporation, ) 
) Case No. 13874 
Plaintiff-Respondent,) 
• " . . . ' • . ) • • • • 
vs * ) 
• • ' . ) • • • 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, ) 
) ' • ' . 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The action was brought by the Plaintiff against the 
Defendant seeking recovery of $20,134.35 owing on a 
pay back contract entered into by the parties. Under the 
contract, the City was to reimburse the Plaintiff for the 
cost of constructing a sewer main leading from the end of 
the City's isystem to the Plaintiff's two subdivisions. 
The repayment was to be at the rate of $1.50 per connection, 
per month for seven years, payable out of the monthly 
revenues received by the City from the sewer connections 
in the subdivisions. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
" 1 " " • " • 
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without a jury who found for the Plaintiff-Respondent on the 
basis of the contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant appeals upon the grounds that recovery on the 
contract is barred because of failure to comply with Statutory 
requirements, that the Lower Court admitted oral testimony 
varying the terms of written sewer extension contracts, and that 
the evidence did not establish a contract. 
Respondent seeks to sustain the Trial Court's determination 
that there was a valid contract as a matter of lav; and of fact, 
that Plaintiff complied with all conditions precedent to suit 
and that there was no violation of the Parole Evidence Rule. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has attempted in its Statement of Facts to emphasi 
and state the evidence in favor of its own arguments, rather 
than in accordance with the facts found by the Trial Court. 
Thus, Plaintiff-Respondent sets forth below those facts which 
fairly state the case. 
In April, 1970, the Plaintiff-Respondent, Midwest, acquired 
a tract of land which it later subdivided into Western Hills 
No. 1 and Western Hills No. 2 Subdivisions. (Ex. D-5) 
The Subdivision Plats were submitted to the West Jordan 
Planning Commission on July 7, 1970, were approved by the City 
Engineer, Ivan Has lain, July 10, 1970, and presented to the City 
Commission on August 6, 1970, at which time the Subdivisions were 
2 • 
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approved. (Ex. D-5) 
Subdivision Western Hills No. 1 is situate on 7800 
South and Subdivision Western Hills No. 2 is situate South 
of No. 1. Both Subdivisions are located West of the end of 
the then existing City sewer line at 3200 West. (Ex. P-l). 
In order for Midwest to develop these new Subdivisions, it 
was necessary to bring the sewer main from the end of the 
Cityfs line at 3200 West, westerly along 7800 South to the 
Subdivisions. 
In early August Mr. Arch Coates, the Developer of the 
Subdivisions for the Plaintiff for purposes of subdividing, 
met with the City Council and obtained some preliminary 
cost figures reflecting the cost of constructing the sewer 
main along 7800 South. (T. 60, 61) Pie thereupon met with 
the City Commission on August 4, 1970, and presented a 
feasibility study based upon an estimated cost of $14,682.00 
which would be paid back over a five year period. "(T. 62; 
Ex. P-4) The City thereafter responded that the five year 
period for the pay back was too short and asked that the 
five years be extended to seven years. (T. 65) In subsequent 
discussions the City and the Plaintiff agreed that the price 
would be reduced to $1.50 per connection per month. (T. 72) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent submitted three bids (Exs. 9, 10 
and 11) to the City Council on September 29, 1970, (Ex. P-13). 
having received them from the City Engineer, Caldwell, Richards 
and Sorenson. (T. 110-112) Construction of the line began and 
was completed some time in December, 1970, (T. 101) at which 
, -3 • 
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time the City Engineer informed the City that the sewer line 
had been completed at a cost of $20,134.35, and recommended that 
the City accept the sewer as part of the City collection system. 
(Ex. 9) House construction in the Subdivisions began in late 
December, 1970, and continued over the next two years, ending 
September 29, 1972, v/hen the last connections were made to the 
sewer system. (T. 129) 
At various City Council meetings attended by representatives 
of Midwest, the Plaintiff's pay back agreement was considered: 
On February 2, 1971, the Council recognized 
the existance of the original agreement. The contract 
form drawn up by the City Attorney was for $20,134.35 
and the Council decided it should meet with the Officials 
from Midwest to renegotiate the contract or to justify 
the increased cost. (Ex. P-14) 
On August 3, 1971, a representative of Midwest 
met with the City Council at which meeting the terms of 
the original agreement were discussed. The terms were: 
$1.50 per month per unit for a period of seven years. 
The Council agreed that it would have to stay with 
that agreement. (Ex. P-15) 
On September 21, 1971, there was a general discussion 
of pay-back agreements at the Council meeting and it 
was suggested that the sewer charges be raised in order 
to pay off the pay-back at a faster rate. The Mayor 
and the Council, indicating that it was for the benefit 
of the City, agreed to the pay-back arrangement. (Ex. P-16) 
4 
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On September 28, 1971, there was a full discussion 
of the pay-back agreement and it was stated that a 
tentative agreement had been reached with Mr. Coates 
at the rate of $1.50 per month per connection for a 
maximum of seven years. Upon motion, properly seconded, 
the Council unanimously voted that: 
"We pay a maximum of $1.50 per month to the 
Contractor. The Contractor's pay back would 
terminate at the end of seven years, while the 
pay back to the City would continue until the 
obligation is paid....voting was unanimous in 
the affirmative." (Ex. P-17) 
On October 5, 1971, the City adopted an Ordinance 
No. 17A entitled, 
"An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 17, Paragraph 
Relating To Schedule Of Monthly Service Rates (In 
City) Establishing The Monthly Sewer Fee For A Single 
Dwelling Unit To Be Charged To Residents Of The City 
Of West Jordan In Connection With The Pay Back 
Agreement On Sewer Connections." (Ex. P-18)• 
On September 5, 1972, some three weeks prior to 
the installation of the last sewer hookup in the Subdivisions, 
which occurred on September 29, 1972, (T. 129) the City 
Council once again considered the pay-back agreement. At 
this time Mr. Ray Green of Midwest explained in great 
detail the history of the agreement. The City Council 
indicated that it could not give any answer at that time, 
and that the matter would have to be discussed later among 
the Council Members and the Engineer. (Ex. P-19) 
Finally, on March 1, 1973, following a meeting of the 
City Council on February 27, 1973, the pay-back agreement 
in the amount of $20,134.35 was rejected by the unanimous 
' •' 5 - .' 
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vote of the Council. (Ex. P-20) This was the first 
rejection and first denial of responsibility on the 
part of the City. (T. 127) 
A history of the City's informal operating procedures in 
considering and adopting resolutions, ordinances and contracts 
is shown by the following: 
The City Recordcnr, in this case Muriel Anderson, 
acting as such since January 7, 1974, had custody of the 
Minute Book of the City and also had custody of the City 
Ordinances. (T. 48, 55) There are no signatures or • .. 
certificates affixed by the City Recorder even though 
these are the official minutes and resolutions adopted 
by the City Council. (T. 50) During 1970-1971 the 
City contracts and agreements were not signed by the 
City Recorder. (T. 57) 
Past contracts for the extension of culinary water 
lines, etc., (Ex. P-25) were not countersigned by the 
City Recorder, nor were contracts covering other sub-
divisions within the City of West Jordan. (T. 68) 
The City had previously entered into other contracts 
on October 6, 197 0 (Ex. D-2 3) where the agreement was 
handled by mere motion, second and unanimous voting. 
Even valid ordinances which the Defendant-Appellant 
stipulated were the official ordinances . (T. 52; Ex. P-18) 
are adopted without signature or without indication of the 
voting, other than the statement "unanimous". 
The City has been bound for many years by oral contracts 
6 
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with Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson for the rendering of 
engineering services; and such contracts are neither signed 
nor executed by the City. (T. 54) 
As each house in the subdivisions was built and hooked up 
to the sewer, the City began receiving $3.25 per month, per 
house. The value of the sewer main built by Midwest has been 
added to the City's assets. (T. 160) The funds from the 
monthly $3.25 charge go to pay for the 7800 South line as well 
as for the interior Subdivision sewer systems. (T. 158) 
Finally, on May 17, 1973, of the Plaintiff's agreement, 
the Plaintiff submitted a verified claim. (Ex. P-21) The 
action was commenced July 13, 1973. (T. 42) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CITY IS NOT RENDERED INVALID 
BY STATUTE. 
A. This is not a contract requiring posting and/or 
publication of notice. 
Appellant relies on Section 10-7-20 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, in arguing that this contract was one for public improvements, 
and thus had to be open for public bidding after proper publication 
of notice. There are several reasons why this argument fails: 
1. The Statute expressly limits its application to those 
improvements "to be paid for out of the General Funds of the City 
or Town...". It is clear that the pay back costs are not payable 
out of the General Fund, but are to be paid out of the Utility 
• • 7 
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Fund. In the Minutes of September 28, 1971, we find the 
following: 
"The Mayor told the Councilmen that it would be 
necessary to arrange a pay back agreement because 
the General Fund is not set up to absorb this expense." 
In the Minutes of September 21, 1971 (Ex. P-16) there is 
a distinction made between the Utility Fund and the General 
Fund. The report of the City Accountant was that the * 
City was earning good money "from the utility operations". 
These minutes a.lso indicate that the Accountant was trying to 
determine if money could be transferee! m the Utility Fund 
reserve to the General Fr.nd, if it is held in restricted funds. 
Reference is also made to the Ordinance enacted on October 5, 
1971, (Ex. P-18) wherein the City specifically increases the 
assessment from $3.25 to $4.75 to pay fo3: the pay back agree-
ment on the sewer construction. Also it is clear from the 
testimony of the City Recorder and from Ordinance 4 2 (Ex. D-27) 
that the money from the utilities goes into the Utility Fund. 
(T. 152,158,159) 
2. The terms of the agreement itself indicate that the 
payments are not to come from the General Fund at all, but are 
to be taken from the fees collected from the use of the sewer 
system. Our Utah Supreme. Court has specifically held that this 
Section does not apply to improvements to be paid for exclusively 
out of the proceeds derived from the improvements themselves. 
S e e
 Barnes vs. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 P 878, Utah Power 
and Light Company vs. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P 2d 1191. 
3. The Statute has specific language excepting from its 
8 
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Application the contracts for "making connection with water 
mains or sewers.. . " . 
4. Additionally, but quite fundamentally, is the fact 
that the contract is not one for the construction of a public 
improvement. Appellant in this case is the owner of the property, 
is the constructor of the sewer systems, the water systems and 
the sewer main, all of which are necessary for the development 
of the two Subdivisions, and which are owned by the subdivider 
until dedicated to the City. There is no way that the Appellant, 
Midwest, would be required to put up for bid the construction of 
its own system. The system is a requirement to be met in order 
to develop the Subdivisions. It is difficult to understand how 
a public bidding concept would fit into the subdividers respon-
sibility to furnish sewer and water. 
Also, this is an agreement to repay the developer for 
expenses he incurred in constructing the sewer main leading to 
its Subdivisions. There is nothing that could be put up for 
bid. If the reasonableness of the price were at issue, we 
nevertheless have the Cityfs stipulation that the sum is reason-
able. Also, of course, the evidence is clear that the City was 
notified before the work started of the three bids which had 
been received by the City Engineer and turned over to the developer. 
Then, finally the City Engineer himself approved and found said 
costs of $20,134.35 proper. (T. 104; Exs. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) 
B. Countersignature by the City Recorder is not required. 
Appellant relies upon Section 10-10-61 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as Amended, for the argument that since the City Recorder of 
' . 9 • • • • • 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the City of West Jordan did not countersign the contract between I 
the City and Midwest, the contract is invalid. Respondent does 
not believe that this Section of the Code has that effect on the 
subject contract, and particularly is this so in view of the 
historical methods of procedure followed by the City of West I 
Jordan, a City of the Third Class. 1 
The definite thrust of this Statute is to the effect that 
contract documents are involved and in existance and are signed I 
by someone. Thereafter, the City Recorder must "countersign". 
The word is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, at I 
page 4 21 as: 1 
"COUNTERSIGN": As a noun, the signature of a 
secretary or other subordinate officer to any i 
writing signed by the principal or superior to I 
vouch for the authenticity of it... (Cites cases); 
and 
As a verb, to sign in addition to the signature of I 
another in order to attest the authenticity. (Cites 
cases)." I 
Thus, in our case, we have no separate contract document 
as such, previously signed by someone, but in fact have resolutions 
or minutes of the City Council setting forth the contract. There 
actually is no document to which such a countersignature could I 
be affixed. The purpose is obviously to authenticate the jj 
particular separate document. This authenticity of our minutes and 
resolutions is indicated in the testimony of the present City 
Recorder who stated that these were the authentic resolutions and
 1 
records of the City even though there were no signatures of the ' 
City Recorder affixed to any of the minutes included in the entire ( 
Minute Book, from which the particular minutes evidenced by the 
1 0 ' •;.' 
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Exhibits in this case were taken. (T. 49-51) No claim was 
ever made by the City (until this lawsuit) that the agreement 
failed for lack of a countersignature. The City has never had 
a countersignature of the Recorder on anything. 
We think therefore that the duty of the City Recorder is a 
ministerial duty imposed by this Section for purposes of authentic-
ating certain contract documents, and this Section of the Code is 
not intended to provide a governmental veto by the City Recorder, 
nor is it intended to nullify the effect of resolutions and minutes, 
together with the agreements set forth therein, duly adopted by 
the City's Governing Board, it's City Council. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court in Cooper vs. Holder, 21 Utah 
2d 40, 440 P 2d 115, states as is the case here that when, 
"...(A) contract has been entered into for that purpose, 
the City Council's function of policy making has been 
fulfilled; and there then is no policy decision to be 
made as to whether the City will pay what it owes for 
the services received." 
I n
 Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Company vs. City of 
Richfield, 84 Utah 107, 34 P 2d 945, this Court has specifically 
held that minutes of the City Council are evidence of the facts 
therein recired, stating, 
fl
...(T)he minutes were kept by various Recorders of 
the City. The law requires that such minutes be kept. 
Rev. St. Utah 1933, 15-6-44. Being public records they 
were competent evidence of the facts therein recited." 
The legislative and governing body of cities of the Third 
Class consist of the Mayor and City Council. Section 10-6-5, Utah 
Code Annotated. The governing body shall meet, keep a journal of 
its proceedings, and take a vote upon the passage of all ordinances 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
and propositions creating liabilities against the City, and I 
shall enter the vote upon the journal of its proceedings. 
Section 10-6-9. The City Recorder for cities of the Third I 
Class is an appointive officer and that person shall also be
 a 
ex officio City Auditor. Section 10-6-30. Thus, it is * 
appropriate to note that the City Recorder is not a member of I 
the City Council and is not granted any voice in the governing 
or legislative function of the City. Quite obviously the City 1 
Recorder has no veto power over the legislation adopted by
 f 
the City at its regular governing meetings. ' 
The duties of the City Recorder are set forth in Section I 
10-10-60 wherein he is required to keep the papers and records 
of the City, keep a record of the proceedings of the governing I 
body (City Council) and attend the meetings of the governing 
body. There thus seems little doubt but that the City Council ' 
enacts the governing and legislative pronouncements for the City j 
and that the City Recorder has a ministerial duty of authenticating 
such agreements. There is no requirement whatsoever that a City J 
has to reduce to a separate written contract form, any agreements 
entered into. The actions which bind the City are handled-at the ' 
Council Meetings and are set forth in the minutes, resolutions and 1 
ordinances. 
In our case, we have many Minutes of the City Council j 
extending back to August 1970 and continuing on through September . 
1972, in which the agreement with the Plaintiff is discussed in ' 
its various details. However, specifically on September 28, 1971. I 
(Ex. P-17) the City Council, after considerable discussion 
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concerning the pay back agreement, took the following action: 
"Mr. Hunt made the motion that we set the 
pay back agreement at $1.50 per month to be 
paid by the homeowner. Also, that we pay a 
maximum of $1.50 per month to the contractor. 
The contractor's pay back would terminate at 
the end of seven years, while the pay back to 
the City would continue until the obligation 
is paid. Motion was seconded by Mr- Copeland. 
Voting was unanimous in the affirmative." 
Incidentally, Muriel Anderson, the City Recorder was present 
at the meeting, although her status is not shown. This meeting, 
of course, occurred at a time when a substantial part of the 
Subdivision had hooked up, and nine months after the main line 
had been constructed and the cost thereof submitted to the City 
Council by the City Engineer, under date of December 8, 1970.-' 
(Ex. P-9) Thus, we do have in addition to the various minutes 
and meetings preceeding September 28, 1971, a reaffirmation in 
writing properly voted upon and adopted unanimously at a regular 
meeting of the governing body of the City of West Jordan of an 
agreement to pay back $1.50 per month per connection extending over 
a seven year period. All of the Statutory requirements were met, 
the minutes and the agreement have been authenticated by the City 
Recorder, and although no separate contract document was prepared 
and executed, and certainly no countersignature appears on such 
document that was not executed, the City has properly acted. 
One should not overlook the fact, also, that the City had 
traditionally entered into agreements without any countersigning 
by the City Recorder. (T. 54, 57, 68; Ex. P-25) The City 
has, of course, adopted ordinances and resolutions involving 
financial obligations on the part of the City even though there has 
13 
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been no countersignature on the part of the City Recorder. 
(T. 48, 50) See Sidney Stevens Implement Company vs. Ogden City, 
83 Utah 578, 33 P 2d 181, for the holding that a City can be 
bound by an implied contract which arises out of the general power 
of the City under Section 15-7-1 R.S.V., 1933 which vests in it 
the right and power to "make contracts and acquire and hold real 
and personal property for corporate purposes." This Section 
is now, Section 10-7-1, Utah Code Annotated. 
Although Appellant has not cited the case of Rapp vs. Salt 
Lake City, 527 P 2d 651, Utah , we are aware of the case, 
but believe that it is distinguishable from the subject case in 
several respects. First, the Rapp case is a tort action against 
the City based upon misrepresentation, and in effect seeks to 
impose an unjust, enrichment claim against the City regardless of 
the intentions of the parties. furthermore, the case in arguing 
for unjust enrichment, attempts to set up contracts arising out 
of an invitation to bid and a bid made pursuant thereto. The case 
was decided upon summary judgment without evidence upon many facet 
of the case, and particularly as to whether or not the City 
Recorder did countersign any agreement. Quite obviously, where 
there were no City Commission Minutes or Resolutions there would 
have been no countersignature. We believe that the Court v/as 
merely indicating by dicta various elements which go to make up 
statutory requirements of certain types of contracts and where 
the contract in the Rapp case was implied in every sense of the 
word, obviously the requirements were not met. 
In our case, however, we have a definite course of action 
14 
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upon which the Plaintiff relied, which course of action was 
represented by minutes and approvals by the City Council as 
well as a formal resolution properly adopted, as has been indicated 
above. We think that the Rapp case therefore is not determinative 
of our situation* 
C. Plaintiff-Respondent complied with Sections 63-30-13 -
and 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated. 
Appellant argues that the Plaintiff did not file a claim 
within 90 days after the cause of action arose. This point 
simply involves a fact question, which the Lower Court has 
decided. Determining when the cause of action arises in a case 
where no specific period of time has been agreed to for the 
performance, becomes a question of reasonableness, which the 
Trial Court must settle. OfHair vs. Counalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 463 
P 2d 799. In examining the evidence in this case, we conclude 
that the Trial Court was justified in determining that the 
Notice sent on May 17, 1973, (Ex. P-21) was within the 90 day 
requirement of Section 63-30-13. 
Beginning August of 1970, and continuing on through the 
period up until September 1971, the parties met from time to 
time in the Council meetings to solidify the pay-back agreement. 
(Exs. P-13, P-14, P-15, P-16 and P-17) On October 5, 1971, the 
Council adopted Ordinance 17A to increase sewer rates so the 
pay back obligation would be better funded. (Ex. P-18) Thereafter 
in September, 1972, a further meeting was had at which the City 
explained that the matter would have to be taken up again two 
weeks hence. (Ex. P-19) Thereafter nothing occurred until a 
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1 
meeting on February 27, 1973 at which the City Council decided • 
I 
to reject the agreement. This rejection was given to the 
Plaintiff by letter of March 1, 1973. (Ex. P-20) Thereafter, ' 
on May 17, the Notice was sent to the Appellant. (Ex. P-21) 
Mr. Green, who was handling the affairs for Midwest, J 
testified that at no time had the City rejected his claim or • 
determined that it would not pay until he recieved the rejection 
in March 1973. (T. 127) I 
Therefore, it is reasonable to find that the Plaintiff had 
every reason to believe that the contract was going to be | 
honored until he received the unequivocable rejection, March 1, i 
1973. 
Appellant also claims that under Section 63-30-15 the action 1 
must be commenced within one year after the denial. It is 
obvious that the Appellant in construing Sections 63-30-13 and | 
63-30-15 has overlooked Section 63-30-14. Quite obviously the j 
provisions of 63-30-13 require the filing of a claim. Section 
63-30-14 provides that if the City does not approve or deny that 
claim so filed within 90 days, then the claim shall be deemed to 
have been denied. Section 63-30-15 thereupon states that an | 
action must be commenced within one year after said denial. i 
Thus, we have the following sequence: On March 1, 1973, the 
City rejected the Plaintiff!s claim thus setting up the cause 1 
of action. On May 17, less than 90 days later the Plaintiff filed 
its claim. The action was then filed July 13, 197 3. All of this I 
shows compliance with the aforesaid Statutory requirements. _' i 
Appellant also claims that Section 10-7-77 Utah Code 
' • i 
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Annotated was not followed and that the claim of Plaintiff 
is barred* Section 10-7-77 is a one year Statute of Limitations 
relating to the filing of claims. It obviously conflicts with 
Section 63-30-13 and having been re-enacted in its present 
form in 1973, would seem to have preference over Section 63-30-13. 
However, assuming that the claimant must meet both Statutes it is 
clear from the record that September 29, 197 2, is the date that the 
last connection was made to the sewer system, and that the $1.50 
monthly pay back on that connection would have then commenced 
running and would run for seven years. Strictly speaking, of 
course, the last accrued item would not occur for seven years. 
However, assuming a position most favorable to the Appellant, 
the one year could in no event elapse sooner than September 2.9, 
1973. On the other hand, if the claim accrued when it was denied 
March 1, 1973, then Plaintiff-Respondent had until March 1, 1974, 
in which to file its claim. Thus, there is no interpretation of 
the facts and evidence which could justify any claim that 
Section 10-7-77 has been violated. The claim itself is verified 
and meets the requirements of the Statute. 
In summary, Respondent submits that the Statutes have been 
met, the claim properly filed and the action timely initiated. 
D#
' The method of voting for a resolution under Section 
10-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, has been met. 
There is no doubt but that the August 4, 1970 presentation 
to the Council by Mr. Coates (Ex. *P~4; T. 72, 72, 80-90) does 
not meet the requirements of Section 10-6-9, Utah Code Annotated. 
However, subsequent Council meetings leading up to September 28, 
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1971, indicate the Council's full examination and understanding n 
of the problem resulting in the enactment by unanimous affirmative * 
vote on September 28, 1971 of the proposition. The phrase, "votinc 
i 
was unanimous in the affirmative"/ can only mean that everyone 
present voted yea. It seems rather fundamental that where the | 
voting is unanimous the yeas and the nays have been counted. • 
The minutes of the meeting show the six members present, including 
the Mayor, show the Motion made by Council Member Hunt, show the I 
Motion seconded by Council Member Copeland and show that the voting 
was unanimous in the affirmative, (Ex. P-17) Furthermore, ] 
Muriel Anderson testified that this was the procedure followed i 
by the Council in all of its meetings and that if the voting 
of all members was affirmative that the minutes reflected all 1 
yeas voting unanimously. (T. 163) An examination of other 
ordinances, concerning which there is no question as to the | 
validity thereof, shows that this was a uniform practice of i 
reflecting yeas and nays. (Ex. P-18) Ordinance No. 17A was 
so adopted. Thus, the yeas and nays were properly recorded at 
the meeting at which the pay-back agreement was approved. • 
E. The pay-back agreement satisifies the Statute of Frauds. | 
The writings upon which Plaintiff relies, are of course the j 
minutes and resolutions adopted by the City Council and partic-
ularly the minutes of September 28, 1972. (Ex. P-17) These I 
minutes are sufficient writings to comply with the Statute. 
Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Company vs. City of Richfield, supr| 
Public records are a sufficient memorandum to comply with i 
the Statute of Frauds. The municipal corporation acts through 
1 8 " ••;•,.• •
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its governing body and those actions are expressed in the 
minutes and resolutions. See 72 American Jurisprudence 
paragraph 306 and the cases cited therein. 
The minutes involved here are the official minutes and 
resolutions of the City and are properly authenticated by the 
Recorder. Courts will not search for technicalities to defeat 
rights, but will give liberal interpretation to minutes which 
may be carelessly or inadequately kept by a municipality. 
Stevens vs. Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72, 69N.W. 227. 
POINT II 
NO ORAL EVIDENCE MODIFIED THE TERMS OF WRITTEN SEWER 
EXTENSION CONTRACTS. 
Plaintiff introduced Exhibit 25 consisting of water and 
sewer extension application agreements to show other contracts 
entered into by the City without the formality of countersignature 
of the City Recorder. The content of the documents indicates 
clearly that they relate to the extensions in the Subdivisions. 
They do not relate to the construction of the sewer main. 
They obviously relate to applications for sewer and water 
extensions and indicate the number of copies, that maps of 
the areas were required, the guarantees required and other 
details. There is a sewer extension application and a water 
extension application for each Subdivision. 
Mrs. Anderson, quoted so extensively by Appellant at page 
33 of his Brief, testified on cross examination that she couldn't 
say definitely whether or not these agreements related to the 
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sewer main, (T, 139) She obviously was asked by Defendant's
 ( 
Counsel to give a legal opinion. (T. 138) . " 
The letter of transmittal from the City Engineers (Ex. P-26) * 
4 
shows by the percentage fee figures that the contract figures are 
unrelated to the main line construction. I 
In any event, the written minutes of the City do not constitute 
oral testimony contradicting or varying the terms of these extensidf 
application agreements. I 
POINT III 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDING . 
THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT. 
The City received the benefit of a sewer main at the cost of J 
$20,134.35; it received the value of added tax base in terms 
of the homes in the Subdivisions; it received the revenue | 
from the monthly sewer payments of $3.25. (T. 150, 160) . 
The clear intent of the resolution passed by the City ' 
is that the cost previously given to the City in 1970 would I 
be repaid at the rate of $1.5 0 per house, per month. The 
Trial Court had sufficient evidence to find a contract existed | 
to repay the sum of $20,134.35, the reasonable cost of . 
constructing the sewer. Respondent respectfully urges that ' 
the Trial Court Judgment be affirmed. J 
Respectfully submitted, 
Elliott' tee Pratt 
Attorney for Respondent 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R E I V E D 
L A






I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
